The Bar. Many of these men have achieved, in past centuries, a spectacular degree of upward mobility (itself of interest to historians) through mastering the peculiar techniques necessary to scale the slopes of the Law Mountains. We watch in astonishment, from the ground, as our subjects make their way up one or another commanding height of Law (and equally, of social station).
But for most historians, that is about as close as we get. We do not know much about the mountains, even less how to climb them ourselves.
Occasionally one of us will try to track the route of one of those lawyermountaineers whom we usually watch from the ground. It quickly becomes apparent that even a short walk in the Law Mountains may require an intense, if improvised, course in technique. 2 And to ·get to the objective quickly (the imperative for all legal climbers) one cannot linger en route to ponder the origin of the range, or to wonder at curious rock formations and admire the goats.
But that is what the historian will want to do: understand the origins of the mountains, their stratification, the forces that shaped them-and, incidentally, to admire the goats. If practising lawyers are competitive climbers at heart, most historians are contemplative geologists.
Historians tell a modern fable about the Law Mountains. The historian, perhaps unwisely, stopped listening, and many decades ago organised his fellows to tackle the Law Mountains in a less sporting way. We are tunnelling. The computerised MOLE 5 chews through parchment-paper conglomerates like butter, and Old Felony in particular, which is not much bigger than Snowdon, will be thoroughly honeycombed in the next 50 years or so. 6 As the archives are sounded, the patterns found in the records of the The role of juries changed too. In the eighteenth century, petty jury verdicts (and prosecutorial activity) underwent significant shifts in response to wider economic conditions and associated changes in the character of crime. Moreover, longer-term changes in the structure of punishments during the period in which the main capital statutes were repealed in the early nineteenth century, and the increasing participation of police and stipendiary magistrates in the period 1750 to 1850, greatly increased the conviction rate (from 50 to 80 per cent.) and reduced the incidence of committals not resulting in trial (from 20 to 10 per cent. introduce the values of self-conscious professionalism to every aspect of prosecution and trial, had much influence on Parliament.
The greatest changes in prosecution practice occurred in the period between 1815 and the mid-1850s, when there was both the most spectacular increase in prosecution levels since the seventeenth century, and the sharpest expression of social division in English society since the same period. Both made the wider connotations of criminal law, particularly in the eyes of a nascent working class, of prime concern to the classes represented in Parliament and on the bench. And throughout the period, many significant changes in substantive law and practice were conditioned in large part by the sheer pressure of numbers on the administrative machinery of justice, whether during the interruption of transportation during the American revolutionary war, peace-time explosions of indictment levels, or the rapid secular rise in prosecutions in the first part of the nineteenth century. By the 1860s, in contrast, a long secular decline in prosecution levels to the end of the century settled the main outlines of Victorian criminal justice as solidly as the walls of the new prisons and the newly respectable image of the British bobby.
If changes in the law were closely connected with the incidence of prosecution, both were shaped by much wider social forces. We are led, in other words, from The problem with both these views of the criminal law, even if applied only to two centuries, is not simply that they are very large arguments about law for which different historians will advance many different standards of proof, kinds of evidence, chronologies. It is that they are very large arguments
about not only what was law, but also about its relation to social belief and practice through whole societies over extended periods of time. And the empirical evidence that should be brought to bear to test such generalisations, even for the criminal law alone, does not lie easily to hand. Not only were large parts of the population, including those most subject to prosecutions, not much given to publishing or otherwise recording their thoughts (a problem acknowledged by all historians). There is also the problem that those who did write for posterity (the enlightened agents of legal change in the first view, the imposers of law in the second) left far from unproblematic comments. In dealing with such a highly political issue as law, one so charged with generating and enforcing moral meanings, one so crucial (or so they believed) to the existing social order, they usually gave a limited range of answers about the purposes of the criminal law and admitted to the existence of only a limited range of questions. To frustrate us further, they often, perhaps usually, were not conscious of the fact that they thought within such limits, precisely because they did so.
The result is that beliefs about law in different social classes, and the way those beliefs entered into the relations between those able to create and use law and those largely excluded from c!oing so, are very difficult to recover. It is easy but highly misleading to construct a version of the first side of Diamond's dichotomy (A: "law expresses social norms") by relying on an imputation of motive and belief (usually borrowed from literate contemporaries, or the political prejudices of the historian) to the great majority of the population for whom evidence is sparse. And it is easy but highly misleading to construct a version of the second argument (B: "ruling classes impose law") by simply citing substantive criminal law without showing how it was used, or what personal, class and societal needs it met or failed to meet.
When we turn to eighteenth-century England, we find widespread popular beliefs that certain customs were the embodiment of legality (in rights over land, in artisanal practice, in wage payment, in the organisation of marketing foodstuffs). All were increasingly under pressure from the law of the state but by no means dead. Parts of state law in all these areas (but always in particular instances) moved from ·a partial recognition of some custom, often through increasingly narrow judicial definition, to legislative extinction. Often this evolution met with strong popular resistance, in particular cases, at particular times.
One must start, I think, with the assumption that state law and popular belief shared important areas of agreement but also important areas of disagreement, and try to chart both. And because those conflicts so often surfaced in the criminal law (for reasons to which I shall return) any account that hopes to explain the history of doctrine or administration cannot ignore the social beliefs and practices that surrounded the law in action.
Broadly, there have been a number of paths by which historians have tried to approach the relationship between state law and the belief of different classes.
Three seem to me to be the most important. One has been to examine the records of the courts statistically to find out who was in fact using the law, for what ends, and to what extent. A second has been to study legal proceedings for their wider social meanings for the class that administered the law, and in particular to illuminate the means by which an often intuitive but sometimes overtly conscious orchestration of legal proceedings was addressed to popular perceptions in the inculcation of a common standard of justice. A third has been to try to reconstruct popular attitudes to particular practices on which state law had (or developed) other definitions, and their reciprocal influences. At many points in the development of criminal law and prosecution over this period of two or three centuries, changes will only be fully understood when all three are taken into account.
The most striking first finding from statistical analysis of prosecutions is that for much of this period the total level of activity was very low indeed.
Although the court records surviving from the eighteenth century are voluminous enough to present research problems, it appears that rates of prosecution were markedly lower than in either the seventeenth or the nineteenth centuries.
Clearly, most Englishmen and women took their disputes to fora other than the courts of the state. In minor civil cases they had a network of local courts (still little understood), including courts of requests, in which lay adjudicators could dispense with most of the procedural problems of the common law. And in both civil and criminal matters they frequently had recourse to other laymen. One such man, a Quaker, recorded in the autobiography he wrote for his family that in over 40 years there had been ho formal litigation in his parish, but that he had settled over 600 disputes. We occasionally find scattered references to other occasions when Justices of the Peace, whose mediating role in misdemeanours was well established, exacted public apologies, sometimes on their knees, from transgres-sors whom the community condemned. Where popular condemnation was less likely (as in game cases) extorted apologies were more likely to be printed in the press. One tentative conclusion, then, is that particularly in the eighteenth century, the costs, uncertainties (given the acquittal rate) and punishments of the criminal law encouraged even more of an abstention from state law than in other periods.
The statistical examination of past criminal prosecutions has also shown, in some areas of the country in the eighteenth century, and in national totals for the nineteenth, that prosecutions for theft (the greatest part of crime) were closely related to larger economic changes, notably the rapid price changes for foodstuffs that were the consequence of dearth, and the effects on employment of export markets, the trade cycle, wars, conscription, and the massive demobilisation of troops. Each of these has been given much greater specificity than before, and one general conclusion that emerges is that the pressure of poverty can be more closely related to the incidence of crime than was suggested in early studies, flawed by considering too few of several simultaneously operating causes. In some periods, however short, it seems likely that large proportions of the labouring poor experienced both sudden destitution, murder charges by the state sometimes the result). On the other hand, the quick justice of the crowd against thieves caught red-handed, usually through ducking in a horse-trough, appears rather similar to the very rapid assessment of character and guilt which we now know was the norm in the courts, even in trials on capital statutes. Finally, a most interesting example of the complex relationship between state law and popular beliefs about law, or popular justice, is that of the food riot.
It is interesting in part because it is now one of the best-studied aspects of eighteenth-century popular culture. And the evidence from many hundreds of instances shows that crowd action against bakers and millers suspected of profiting from high food prices was informed by a belief that seizing food and selling it for a "just" price, or punishing the offender more directly, was legitimated by a long tradition of legal sanctions against such suspected exploiters of the community. Magistrates as well as mobs agreed on the value of Tudor and Stuart (and earlier) legislation against middle-men in food enacted to prevent· popular disorder of threatening proportions in times of dearth.
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It is worth pursuing this example a little further, as an illustration of the differences between social history of law and more doctrinal legal history, even when the latter is written by a lawyer highly sensitive to the need for contextual study of the legal past. It may also illustrate my contention that much doctrine may be explicable only by following litigation to its sources.
In whether it is to be dreaded. If he had been told that cattle and corn were brought to market, and then bought by a man whose purse happened to be lo!J.ger than his neighbours, so that the poor man who walks the street and earns his daily bread by his daily labour could get none but through his hands, and at the price he chose to demand; that it had been raised 3d., 6d., 9d., ls., 2s., and more a quarter on the same day, would he have said there was no danger from such an offence?" 18 And in Waddington, where the prisoner was a large dealer in hops (held to be foodstuffs because they were essential to brewing), Kenyon declared that engrossing large quantities, in hopes of an exorbitant profit, "is a most heinous offence against religion and morality, and against the established law of the country."
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For Atiyah, this is a paradoxical survival of an older tradition of benevolent paternalism, especially since Parliament had repealed the statutory provisions almost 30 years before. 20 (It was a paradox that had surfaced before 1800:
Kenyon had taken the opportunity in a case in 1795 to remark that the common law was still in effect.) Atiyah concludes, not unreasonably, that judges often get their law, and their prejudices, fixed at an early age, and suggests that Kenyon (who left the bench in 1802 after a long career) was simply behind the times, uninstructed in the truths advanced by the epigoni of Adam Smith (who indeed had compared the laws against forestalling to those against witchcraft). 21 But the judgments, and particularly Waddington, involved more than political economy and paternalism. Atiyah remarks that that context was one of "acute shortage and high prices" for foodstuffs. 22 It was indeed a crisis.
Food prices in 1800 and 1801 were far higher than they had been during other periods of dearth: from early 1799 when wheat was about 6s. a bushel it had increased 300 per cent. to over a pound a bushel in March 1801 in most parts of the country. Vertiginously high prices were sustained throughout 1800 and 1801. Since bread made up so much of the average diet, a large part of the population was made · destitute: no less than 40 per cent. of the population could not have bought, unassisted, enough bread to survive even if they had spent their entire family incomes on bread alone for the whole of 1801. 23 But it was a crisis not only for the poor. Food riots were widespread throughout the country, with the mob demanding that the authorities enforce the common law penalties against speculators in foodstuffs, in the belief that they were largely responsible for the dearth. Thousands of troops, by early 1801, faced hostile crowds who in some districts conducted a virtual guerrilla warfare against them.
Justices of the peace were hastening to make scores of exemplary prosecutions of middlemen in food, and doing so in the most public manner, in order to restore order. And the magistrates were acutely aware (as was the government) that some of the troops were also disaffected, and that some food riots were accompanied by seditious calls to emulate the French (with whom Britain All this becomes more difficult to remember if the subject is crime, and if the social actors are rioters and burglars as well as judges and victims. An attempt to explain the values and acts of each in equally neutral or sympathetic terms may seem, to a lawyer, presumptuous and wrong, because it entails an uncommitted consideration of the meanings and uses of legal institutions. It has been argued that for those trained in the law, the legal order becomes ideology, that "law, and within it jurisprudence, constitutes 'a world · of its own'-which the inquirer who takes legal norms, as such, as object of knowledge, cannot but inhabit and desire to serve." 28 The assertion is undoubtedly cast in too absolute terms. But when the historian who approaches the criminal law as an object of knowledge encounters the assumption that because state law is an unqualified human good, its victims are self-evidently beneath serious consideration, he suspects the moralistic fallacy on the grand scale.
Presentism, the fallacy of working from present concerns to past origins, is anathema to historians, but necessarily half the lawyer's method. 29 Whatever its merits in finding supporting arguments for a brief, it has the effect in historical work of writing out of the past any developments which did not survive in much the same form into the present. Since there is little in human affairs that did so, not even sex and hunger, it is disastrous as an intellectual method for recovering the past. In search of origins, it tends to find false analogies which, when stripped of context, can be made to look like their putative descendants. Where the object of knowledge has few recognisable descendants, the search does not even begin. Presumably that may explain (to take one example) why so little has been written about the wider effects of the purposeful extinction, through parliamentary enclosure Acts, of a great corpus of customary law in England over the last three centuries, a change which has changed the meaning in England of law itself.
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The fallacy of identity appears likely to be a particular affliction of lawyers looking at history. Training to demonstrate legal consequences from legal causes entails the necessary assumption that legal effects usually have legal causes, or at least that those are the main causes worth considering. It is a presumption that must be immensely strengthened by the persuasive evidence for some autonomy of law. and legal culture from wider social forces. But the form of doctrinal debate is (to an historian) a pervasive form of mono-causal explanation, in which the question of autonomy and its degree are not even raised because the answer is assumed: new law largely is considered in terms of the working-out of implications of old law, and awkward cases tend to be dismissed as a residual term, rather than explained. Historians are sometimes surprised to see such cases (and legislation) smoothly accommodated in accounts in the doctrinal tradition. It may make them wonder if the best efforts of the other profession are not often put to reconciling differences which in other disciplines would call for explanation rather than reconciliation.
The assumption of legal autonomy is often closely allied to a rationalist view of legal decision-making again conditioned by reliance on a narrow range of sources. This, like many of the other points that occur to an historian about legal reasoning, was one of the concerns of the legal realists, but some of their initiatives were doomed to inconclusive results. When they tried to analyse contemporary law the attempt was sure to be only marginally successful, particularly in studies of judicial decision-making, for two good reasons. One (as the reviewer of a recent biography of Frankfurter has pointed out) was that they were themselves insiders. 31 Too rigorous an application of realist criticism could be construed as unseemly, impertinent personal criticism of colleagues with whom the rest of their professional lives were spent. More important was the fact that they could not read the private papers of their subjects. Short of the confessional (and one suspects that some judges in the confessional are as aware of exclusionary· rules there as in their courtrooms), private correspondence, notably correspondence meant to be kept private, is a prime source from which historians (including realists) have considered the levels of overt intention, collective assumptions, class bias, and professional learning (not necessarily in that order) which a bench brings to a case, or an Attorney-General brings to a prosecution. 32 Analysis begins there, since the exercise of power is often a profoundly calculated act, and where it is not consciously so calculated it is enacted within a medium of often unspoken but nonetheless powerful assumptions. Those assumptions include implicit judgments about "proper behaviour" resting on class, interest and ethnicity. Such assumptions often remain unexpressed, either because they are unacceptable within the wider political culture, or simply in the belief that knowledge is often best kept back from most people for their own good. (It is very easy to make that rationalisation if that good is equated with the smooth operation of the instruments of government, or the administration of justice. ) 33 They are particularly likely to remain unexpressed by the bench, as irrelevant to the issue, if the dominant style of legal judgments is narrowly formalist, as it has been in this country for well over a hundred years. In that case, as Atiyah suggests to us, we . may be obliged to watch for instances in which judges "give them-selves away" and reveal values, even unconscious influences, which help them to a decision but which are concealed thereafter in the language of pure doctrine. and it is that multiplicity which constitutes much of the significance of law. 38 Any scholar from another discipline, particularly those which try to view societies in the round, will compile her own list of what appear (from such a perspective) to be idiosyncrasies of legal reasoning. But I think they will often in the end lead to two central tenets: that state law has both matched an unproblematic social consensus and has exhibited a logic largely independent of context, particularly that of economic and class interest. We are told that it is sensitively autonomous. I suggested earlier that in fact the legitimacy and authority of the criminal law are often inferred from an undemonstrated social consensus, and some accounts of the legal past tend to import equally undemonstrate assumptions of autonomy. Robert
Gordon has suggested that that is why traditional legal scholarship tends to be highly suspicious of history in the sense in which historians tout courtpractice it: that is, of history without a prefix, committed to the understanding of the relationships of all social belief and practice. Historians propose to test the autonomy of the law in precisely the way they test the autonomy of other social orders, such as religious beliefs, economic organisation, class division-by looking purposefully for interrelations, in specific detail, in the minds and institutions they jointly form. Gordon argues that legal scholarship, at least in America, responds by employing a battery of intellectual stratagems to resist any recognition of the historical contingency of law.
9
But I suggested earlier that if an ahistorical consciousness might be an expected result of lawyerly habits of thought, it also, at least in this country, has indigenous causes peculiar to England. By that I meant two things.
The first is that the common-law tradition is so broad a part of the constitutional and cultural foundations of this country that there are a host of intimate relations between popular norms and state law, and have been for many centuries. At least in the past, the connections do not amount to anything like the "autonomous but sensitive" criminal law which is often proposed to us. The social history of the criminal law shows that the relationship was instead contradictory, shot through with collective values opposed to state law, popular celebration of old law which the state was bent on purging, and usually a massive avoidance of the state legal apparatus on the grounds that it was both financially rapacious and unpredictable. Nonetheless, when centralised state law is so powerful and so visible, even in limited contexts, from so early a date in the history of the kingdom, it is easy to make a premature identification of state law and popular mores. That kind of oversimplification is less likely when English law is found in a context where elite perceptions cannot be directly identified with national culture, in law or other areas. The extreme case is that of the Third World, where the abrupt intrusion of English and other European law has done much to develop paradigms of imposed law and legal pluralism, and a sensitivity to the concealed and overt class strategies encapsulated in law. Devlin pointed out on another occasion, that it was often the "second-rate" and "the blimps" from England who brought the common law to the colonies. 42 More important, when they used legal arguments resting on English and Imperial precedents, in the cause of self-government, the English response was not congratulation but repression: charges of sedition, imprisonment without recourse to habeas corpus, and within another generation the bloody military suppression of an armed populist insurrection in which French and
Irish nationalist lawyers figured prominently as leaders. The Canadian public prosecutorial tradition also exhibits an interesting mix of traditions, one of them being the Imperial interest in maintaining direct colonial rule from London. 43 The contribution of Scots law is probably important here too, and perhaps also Dublin Castle's highly centralised prosecutorial system which (like its police) was in Ireland an outcome of the determination of the British state to maintain its rule in the face of a greatly rebellious population. 44 If some of its emigrant lawyers probably helped to found a system of prosecution in Canada with some democrat, being an advanced Whig was enough, by the 1790s, to ensure that his theories would alarm Tories, one of whom 'once denounced his "democratical principles, and that sceptical philosophy which young noblemen and gentlemen of legislative rank carried into the world with them from his law-class, and . . . displayed with popular zeal, to the no small danger of perversion to all those under their influence. " 51 An analysis which distinguished different interests in society, and contested an aristocratic hegemony in government (at a point when that influence was stronger than any time earlier in the century) was uncomfortable.
At a time when the ideologues of the status quo fought Jacobinism by emphasising the blindness of English law to social division, having a "sceptical" law professor do the opposite was deeply disturbing.
England's upper-class political culture was profoundly anti-Revolutionary during the French wars and for decades thereafter, and it was in that period that Smith In such circumstances the criminal law, although so heavy an engine of social ordering that it should never be used lightly, was absolutely indispensable. A strong and enlightened leadership from men of the higher and professional classes (and Stephen undoubtedly saw himself as one such) could be expected to use it with care and discretion and, where necessary, harsh effectiveness.
Criminal law was of political significance, in the widest sense. s 7 But Stephen was also writing within the tradition of legal evolutionism shared by his friend Henry Maine, and probably at its height. There was a marked equivocation in Stephen's treatment of the relationship of the criminal law to wider social norms. On the one hand, he argued in defence of legislation for morals that there was a general social consensus on the boundaries of good and evil, for which the criminal law was (where its standard of proof reached) an effective expression: "the ratio ultima of the majority against persons who its application assumes to have renounced the common bonds which connect men together. "s 9 But the highest efficacy of the law is not simply that it expresses such moral majoritarian sentiments-that it gives effect to predominant opinion, especially with respect to the most serious crimes-but that it shapes that opinion, and can help create normative majorities, if used with care:
"Even indifferent or virtuous acts will come to be condemned by the moral sentiment of particular times and places, if the law condemns them." 60 At many points in Stephen's treatment, t e n s io n s of that kind, arising largely from the possibility of different class perceptions of The Good, lead him towrite a more rounded account of the law than any doctrinal exposition could be. He emphasised, for instance, that prosecution conducted in the form of private litigation also immensely strengthened the capacity of the criminal law to teach moral lessons in a theatrical setting. To contemporary suggestions that the English prosecutorial system was inefficient, he replied that that was a necessary price to pay for the legitimacy that the mode of prosecution conferred on the criminal law, and on the constitution, as a
whole. An efficient prosecution in the hands of the state could too easily (even if wrongly) be identified with tyranny. The criminal law's great capacity for obtaining consent to the social order should never be sacrificed to lesser goals. 61 Stephen shared a belief of many social historians now studying the eighteenth and nineteenth century that "the administration of criminal justice is the commonest, the most striking, and the most interesting shape, in which the sovereign power of the state manifests itself to the great bulk of its subjects. But we too are aware of a degree of wariness among the lawyers. In the fable with which I began, there was one last warning given to the historian before he went off to tunnel through the strata of legal manuscripts. In solemn tones, the lawyer gave him formal notice: "Do no environmental damage. We take conservation of the Law Mountains very seriously indeed." (London, 1964) , Chap. 11, for an account of the Campbell case, which led to the defeat of the first Labour Government, and strengthened the quasi-judicial role of the Attorney-General.
Notes
s Mark One Legal Excavator. The computer has made it possible to handle the great bulk of past judicial records; and to relate them to other social facts, in ways not possible before. English criminal records invite such treatment, particularly for the period before the nineteenth century: see Hay, "War, Dearth and Theft: the Record of the English Courts" (May, 1982) 95 Past & Present. The Maitland Club was digging long before. 6 A very rough estimate (and any other is impossible) suggests that for the year 1783 (an average one for the 1780s, a busy but not grossly untypical decade for the courts) there were less than 50 criminal cases reported, most of them settlement and other poor law cases (1-8 Brown's Parliamentary Cases (1-3 E.R.); 3 Douglas (99 E.R.); Ca/decott's Magistrates Cases). ln the same year there were 500 committals at the Home Circuit assizes alone, and possibly a total of 10,000 prosecutions on indictment, summarily before magistrates, and on certiorari or by criminal information in King's Bench, for the country as a whole. Evidence for perhaps one-third of that bulk of cases (mostly on indictment) probably survives, with comparable evidence for each year of the eighteenth century for the later periods, variable but generally lesser amounts for earlier. 7 One reason may be the fact that until very recently the bulk of lawyerly legal history, at least in England, has concerned other areas of the law, perhaps rcHccting the powerful orderiag of priorities within the profession: "Crime has never been the business of lawyers." (S. F. C. .Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths, 1969). concluding sentence.) It is easier for me to describe the reasons from the historian's side. They include the development of a large body of work on popular protest, in which the criminal law figures importantly as respondent (and precipitant); the importance of the criminal law to the early history of working-class political movements and trade unionism; a growing realisation among historians (in England dating largely from the establishment of County Record Offices after the war) that the very large surviving deposits of criminal court records contained much information about aspects of past daily experience not found in other sources; the layman's greater consciousness of the criminal law (perhaps reHccting its importance in structuring that consciousness in all periods); the legislative bias of the crimin.al law, a comfort to those acquainted with only that source of law (and historians continue for the most part to shun the others); the relative simplicity of criminal procedure (although many have not appreciated its complexities); and the place of the reform of the substantive criminal law in general histories of ideas, parties, religion and government in the period 175(}.. was divided on whether regrating was an indictable offence at common law, after hearing arguments on a rule to show cause why judgment should not be arrested. Waddington, who was convicted and also punished by fine and imprisonment, was a Jacobin. He had been expelled from the Surrey troop of light horse for his radical politics, and had attacked Burke in print for slandering the French Revolution. The prosecution was begun by other hop-factors, but for the government he was a most convenient target for a criminal information for engrossing at a time when food riots against engrossers had been tinged with Jacobin slogans. I shall publish a fuller account of the case. 26 As K,alm-Freund observed, in a modem instance, "the law reparts are the worst possible mirror of society. They convey to the beholder a distorted image in which that which is marginal appears as typical, and this may be one of the reasons why sometimes the judgments of lawyers on social policy are so surprisingly warped and ill-founded" (1970) 33 M.L.R. 241, 242.
